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Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment is undoubtedly a 
thought-provoking book edited by Richard Albert (Boston College Law School), 
Xenophon Contiades (Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences; Cen-
tre for European Constitutional Law) and Alkmene Fotaidou (Centre for European 
Constitutional Law). 
To better understand what a book is, it is sometimes important to point out 
what a book is not. Hence, this book is not an ungainly bricolage of random 
papers, but rather the most accomplished project of comparative constitutio- 
nal amendment of the past few years. The embryonic stage of the book can 
be traced to a reflection about Comparative Constitutional Amendment, held 
in May 2015 at Boston College Law School. The discussion continued outside 
the workshop and resulted in 20 fascinating essays, which offer a solid and 
comprehensive inquiry into the historical evolution and the current challenges of 
amendment rules. 
The vexata quaestio of how to balance an old constitutional text with new 
historical, societal and political scenarios has occupied the mind of legal and 
philosophic scholars for decades. One can remember how Karl Löwenstein, in 
his famous book Verfassungslehre, tried to discover the “magic formula” of a 
lasting Constitution. Löwenstein’s perception of how a constitutional text can 
lack normative content and have no strength to block the violation of fundamen-
tal rights encouraged him to develop the theory of the normative force of the 
Constitution. 
However, nowadays, the possibilities and limitations of constitutional design 
may be broader than in the last century. These motivate us to reflect upon the 
Constitution and its essential values. Although informal amendment has received 
substantial attention, there is an upsetting lack of profound studies on formal 
amendment and its implications (David Kenny, Kate Glover, Lael K. Weis, Richard 
Albert and Oran Doyle). One of the many merits of this volume is precisely a 
far-reaching commitment to formal amendment possibilities and limitations. 
Another merit is the voice given to new comparator legal systems, which 
gives attention to a sometimes hidden cross-border interaction between either 
new or well-established jurisdictions. As Laurence Tribe eloquently wrote in The 
Invisible Constitution: “the long-run costs of wearing global blinders – and even 
of pretending to wear them while in fact peeking across the seas (…) – would 
outweigh the short-term tactical gains of mollifying those who fear that such 
glances at other lands are but the harbingers of an abandonment of our so- 
vereignty and of our exceptionalism”. In confirmation, Otto-Brum Bryde, former 
Justice at the German Federal Constitutional Court, held that even jurisdictions 
from consolidated democracies and with highly respected constitutional courts 
should benefit from legal comparison. 
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The fact that the editors have explicitly chosen to trace relevant develop-
ments in comparative public law regardless of the State’s constitutional popula- 
rity (if one may even use that expression) is a form of intellectual humbleness that 
must be praised and pursued.
The book is divided into two parts: Part I: The Foundations of Constitutio- 
nal Amendment; Part II: The Traditions of Constitutional Amendment. The first 
part develops the underpinning elements of constitutionalism. The second part 
explores the traditions of constitutional amendment, by means of several com-
parative studies.
An endogenous feature of Law is that its object tends to focus on a limited 
time horizon: the near past, the present and the immediate future. As Peter 
Häberle and António Castanheira Neves once described, this temporal trait is 
especially evident in constitutional lawmaking, since constitutions share static 
and dynamic characteristics. In a retrospective view, the Constitution aims to 
maintain historical heritage. In a prospective look, the normative force of the 
Constitution has an umbilical connection with its openness to adapt to the evo-
lution of the constitutional reality. 
For this reason, constitutional-makers should try to undertake a task of ac-
tio in distans, seeking to concentrate their normative efforts not only on their 
foreseeable “people”, but also keeping in mind the future generations. Still and 
echoing Gianluigi Palombella concern, the main question remains unanswered: 
why are present and future generations bound to comply with rules dictated by 
“a dead people”?
If, in fact, as Thomas Jefferson famously observed, “the earth belongs to the 
living”, then one should not be surprised that constitutions as intergenerational 
pacts struggle with inevitable asymmetrical ponderation. Like other legislative 
acts, constitutions also reflect the endogenous day-to-day reasoning that cha- 
racterises democratically approved laws. Democracy is a pro tempore pheno- 
menon which envisions the possibility of political, idiosyncratic or societal change. 
At the same time, constitutional design is not immune to synchronic reasoning, 
therefore favouring present generations, to the detriment of future ones.
As Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou very eloquently wrote, 
“the fragile balance between constitutionalism and democracy is constantly re- 
assessed through constitutional amendment, which is an ongoing attempt to 
reconcile the two”. Sofia Ranchordás argues that the “legitimacy of this inter-tem-
poral binding” will depend on the willingness of the constituent power to dialogue 
with the future generations. One possibility that should not be immediately reject-
ed is the contribution of sunrise clauses, which allow constitutional contingency.
The seminal distinction between primary and secondary constituent power 
is revisited (Luisa Fernanda García López, Thomaz Pereira and Zoran Oklopcic). 
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In response to the democratic paradox of unamendability, it is stressed that 
neither the Constitution nor the unamendability clauses themselves can block 
the primary constituent power and its sovereignty (Joshua Braver, Mark Tushnet 
and Yaniv Rosnai). Despite the “seduction of constitutionalism” (Juliano Zaiden 
Benvindo), the constitution is not just a precious piece of paper and should also 
be perceived through tridimensional lenses, which include constitutional reality 
and constitutional values as well.
Furthermore, the paradox of constitutionalism ought to be seen as a (semi)
conscious rejection of “alternatives to the vocabulary of peoplehood” (Zoran 
Oklopcic) and attention should be given to the extent to which constitutional 
constraints disempower current majorities in favour of former generations (Oran 
Doyle). Keeping in mind the idea of “the people”, Jean-Phillipe Derosier suggests 
a distinction between the social people and the legal people.
Yet this puzzling constitutional challenge lies in the definition of “the peo-
ple” and in the fact that the ethereal and mythical concept of “people” asks for 
some palpable content. A potential dialogue between the real people and the 
imaginary people can be achieved through inclusive participatory mechanisms 
(Jurgen Goossens and Yaniv Rosnai). 
In an innovative perspective, Yaniv Rosnai states that constitutional amend-
ment powers should not be regarded in a binary perception (limited or un- 
limited), but as a spectrum of scope: the more/less the democratic traits of the 
amendment power resemble those of the primary constituent power, the less 
the democratic power should be bound by limitations. Thus, the democratic 
consistency of primary constituent power is inversely related to the breadth of 
legislative constraints and judicial scrutiny. 
Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou sustain that empirical studies 
and the use of metrics in the field of constitutional amendment should be inter-
preted cum grano salis and attention should be given to the specific constitu-
tional culture. For this reason, constitutional quality cannot be measured simply 
by its low amendment rate, frugality or even by its duration. 
Adopting a different perspective, James E. Fleming argues that the goal of 
constitutional amendment is to correct imperfections of a given Constitution. 
In this sense, a frequently amended Constitution is far from being a good one. 
In many African States, constitutional amendments were instrumentalised for 
securing an immediate political advantage (Duncan Okubasu). In an interesting 
study about the Commonwealth Caribbean, Derek O’Brien stresses the rele-
vance of culture as resistance to constitutional change. 
Concerning aspirational constitutions, characterised for having a generous 
and exhaustive fundamental rights’ catalogue, this kind of prolixity can lead 
to restriction of governments’ freedom of action or to an uncontrolled judicial 
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activism. If the constitutional text is a kind of totem which regulates everything 
until exhaustion, it is the Constitution itself that is at stake. We can, thus, infer 
that the normative force of the Constitution is intrinsically related to the idea of 
essentiality.  
To conclude, we agree with Richard Albert’s clairvoyant observation that 
constitutional amendment scholarship should be equally devoted to formal and 
informal amendment, to their interaction, “and also to the costs and conse-
quences of privileging one over the other”. 
As the brilliant Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa once wrote: “every ges-
ture is a revolutionary act”. Clearly, at the end of the book one is left with the 
certainty that its open-minded and enriching ideas will have a significant, positive 
impact in comparative legal scholarship. For the present reviewer, it has been an 
enjoyable learning experience which reveals with admirable clarity and accuracy 
the challenges of constitutional amendment as a distinct field of study in public 
law. 
